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 1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 
 
TAREQ AQEL MOHAMMED AZIZ, et al., 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v.        Case No. 17-cv-116-LMB-TCB 
         
DONALD TRUMP, President of the     
United States, et al.,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE FRED T. 
KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY, CIVIL RIGHTS 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR, IN 
SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS 
 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Civil Rights Organizations, and 
National Bar Associations of Color hereby submit this Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners and Affirmance.   
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE AND REASONS WHY  
THE MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
Amicus Curiae The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu 
Center”) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School of Law.  The 
Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and education.  Inspired 
by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who defied military orders during World War II that ultimately 
led to the unlawful incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Korematsu Center works to 
advance social justice for all.  The Korematsu Center does not, in this Brief or otherwise, 
represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government action toward 
persons based on race or nationality.  Drawing from its experience and expertise, the Korematsu 
Center has a strong interest in ensuring that courts understand the historical – often racist – 
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underpinnings of doctrines asserted to support the exercise of such legislative and executive 
power.   
Amicus Curiae the National Native American Bar Association’s (“NNABA”) core 
mission is advancing justice for Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and Alaska Natives, 
communities which have survived injustice in the American legal system for hundreds of years, 
as power has gone unchecked and institutionalized discrimination persisted, often with few rising 
to question it.  NNABA believes justice for all Americans is advanced when, as here, citizens 
stand together to examine the fairness of the actions of our institutions. 
Amicus Curiae the South Asian Bar Association of North America (“SABA”) is the 
umbrella organization for 26 regional bar associations in North America representing the 
interests of over 6,000 attorneys of South Asian descent.  SABA provides a vital link for the 
South Asian community to the law and the legal system.  Within the United States, SABA takes 
an active interest in the legal rights of South Asian and other minority communities.  Members of 
SABA include immigration lawyers and others who represent persons that have been and will be 
affected by the Executive Order. 
This Brief is also submitted by all members of Amicus Curiae Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice (“Advancing Justice”), the national affiliation of five nonprofit, nonpartisan 
civil rights organizations: Asian Americans Advancing Justice – AAJC, Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice – Asian Law Caucus, Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Atlanta, Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice – Chicago, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Los 
Angeles.  Members of Advancing Justice routinely file amicus curiae briefs in cases in this Court 
and other courts.  Through direct services, impact litigation, policy advocacy, leadership 
development, and capacity building, the Advancing Justice affiliates advocate for marginalized 
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members of the Asian American, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander and other underserved 
communities, including immigrant members of those communities. 
The Court should use its discretion to grant this Motion, and permit the Amici to file their 
concurrently submitted Brief of Amici Curiae because the information therein is “timely, useful, 
or otherwise necessary to the administration of justice.”  Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 
659 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to allow a non-party 
to participate as an amicus curiae.”). 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint addresses green card holders who were denied entry to the United 
States or forced to withdraw their applications for admission to the United States and/or abandon 
their status as lawful permanent residents as a result of the Executive Order that Defendant 
President Donald Trump signed on January 27, 2017.  Compl. at 11.  Plaintiffs seek permanent 
relief from the Executive Order, including a determination that the Executive Order creates an 
impermissible religious test for travel to the United States.  Compl. at 18.  Amici write to address 
the plenary power doctrine, which Defendants have relied on in this action and other similar 
challenges to support limiting the judicial branch’s authority to question any exercise of the 
President’s executive power.  The proposed Brief seeks to demonstrate that the plenary power 
doctrine derived from decisions such as Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(the “Chinese Exclusion Case”) and its progeny, is premised on outdated racist and nativist 
precepts that we now reject and outdated understandings of sovereignty.  Amici urge this Court to 
consider the historical conditions under which the plenary power doctrine developed and 
justified prior historical developments, which modern courts now recognize as anathema. 
As the proposed Brief of Amici Curiae details, the influence of the plenary power 
doctrine has been steadily eroded in the immigration context.  Separately, but equally significant, 
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the proposed Brief reviews the historical threads of cases that abdicated judicial review of 
executive and legislative actions against entire races or nationalities  and provided judicial 
sanction of discriminatory action taken against disfavored minorities. 
Counsel for the parties have consented to the filing of this brief.    
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should grant this Motion, and permit the Korematsu Center, 
Civil Rights Organizations, and National Bar Associations of Color to file their concurrently 
submitted Brief of Amici Curiae.  Amici Curiae hereby waive a hearing on this motion. 
 
 
 
        Respectfully submitted, 
Dated:  February 9, 2017             
THE FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR 
LAW AND EQUALITY 
 
Robert S. Chang   
901 12th Avenue, Sullivan Hall 
Seattle, WA 98122-1090 
Telephone: (206) 398-4025  
Facsimile: (206) 398-4261 
Changro@seattleu.edu 
 
 
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 
 
/s/ James E. Tysse  
James E. Tysse (VSB 73490) 
1333 New Hampshire Ave, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
Telephone: (202) 887-4571 
Facsimile: (202) 887-4288 
jtysse@akingump.com 
 
Robert A. Johnson (pro hac pending) 
One Bryant Park 
New York, NY 10036 
Telephone: (212) 872-1000 
Facsimile: (212) 872-1002 
Rajohnson@akingump.com 
 
Jessica M. Weisel (pro hac pending) 
1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
Telephone: (310) 229-1000 
Facsimile: (310) 229-1001 
Jweisel@akingump.com 
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Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that, on this 9th day of February 2017, I will electronically file the 
foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification 
of such filing (NEF) to all parties of record. 
 
Dated:  February 9, 2017 
 /s/ James E. Tysse 
 James E. Tysse (VSB 73490) 
1333 New Hampshire Ave, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
Telephone: (202) 887-4571 
Facsimile: (202) 887-4288 
jtysse@akingump.com 
 
Attorney for Amici Curiae 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus Curiae the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu 
Center”) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School of Law.  The 
Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and education.  Inspired 
by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who during World War II defied military orders that ultimately 
led to the unlawful incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Korematsu Center works to 
advance social justice for all.  The Korematsu Center does not, in this Brief or otherwise, 
represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government action toward 
persons based on race or nationality.  Drawing from its experience and expertise, the Korematsu 
Center has a strong interest in ensuring that courts understand the historical – often racist – 
underpinnings of doctrines asserted to support the exercise of such legislative and executive 
power.1
This Brief is also submitted by all members of Amicus Curiae Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice (“Advancing Justice”), the national affiliation of five nonprofit, nonpartisan 
civil rights organizations: Asian Americans Advancing Justice – AAJC, Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice – Asian Law Caucus, Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Atlanta, Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice – Chicago, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Los 
Angeles.  Members of Advancing Justice routinely file amicus curiae briefs in cases in this Court 
and other courts.  Through direct services, impact litigation, policy advocacy, leadership 
development, and capacity building, the Advancing Justice affiliates advocate for marginalized 
                                           
1 No counsel for any party authored this Brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity 
other than amicus made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.  Counsel for 
the parties have consented to the filing of this brief. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief, 
filed concurrently. 
Case 1:17-cv-00116-LMB-TCB   Document 88-1   Filed 02/09/17   Page 5 of 19 PageID# 1038
 2 
members of the Asian American, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander and other underserved 
communities, including immigrant members of those communities. 
Amicus Curiae the National Native American Bar Association’s (“NNABA”) core 
mission is advancing justice for Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and Alaska Natives, 
communities that have survived injustice in the American legal system for hundreds of years, as 
power has gone unchecked and institutionalized discrimination persisted, often with few rising to 
question it.  NNABA believes justice for all Americans is advanced when, as here, citizens stand 
together to examine the fairness of actions taken by institutions. 
Amicus Curiae the South Asian Bar Association of North America (“SABA”) is the 
umbrella organization for 26 regional bar associations in North America representing the 
interests of over 6,000 attorneys of South Asian descent.   SABA provides a vital link for the 
South Asian community to the law and the legal system.  Within the United States, SABA takes 
an active interest in the legal rights of South Asian and other minority communities.  Members of 
SABA include immigration lawyers and others who represent persons who have been and will be 
affected by the Executive Order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this and multiple, similar actions, the government has maintained that this Court may 
not review Executive Order 13769, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry 
into the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (the “Executive Order”), because the 
President has “unreviewable authority” to suspend admission of aliens to this country.  See, e.g.,
Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Intervenor-Petitioner Commonwealth of 
Virginia’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF 80 at 2, 14); Emergency Motion Under 
Circuit Rule 27-3 for Administrative Stay and Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, State of 
Wash. v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017).  That argument advances the “plenary 
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power” doctrine, which, like the “separate but equal” doctrine, is a relic of an odious past that 
has no role in modern American jurisprudence.  Just as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
was influenced by nineteenth century views considered anathema today, the plenary power 
doctrine derives from decisions like Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (the 
“Chinese Exclusion Case”) that were premised on outdated racist and nativist precepts that we 
now reject.
When confronted similarly outdated in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), the Supreme Court recognized that it “cannot turn the clock back” and decide its 
former cases differently.  Instead, it would have to consider the subject of the law “in the light of 
its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”  Id. at 492-93.
Consistent with that principle, courts have not given total deference to executive and legislative 
decisions on exclusion, but have engaged in appropriate judicial review. As a District Court in 
the Western District of Washington recently concluded: “Fundamental to the work of this court 
is a vigilant recognition that it is but one of three equal branches of our federal government” and 
that it must review the Executive Order “to fulfill its constitutional role in our tripart 
government.”  Temporary Restraining Order at 6-7, State of Wash. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00141 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).  This Court should do the same. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE WAS BORN OUT OF RACIST NOTIONS 
AND OUTDATED UNDERSTANDINGS OF SOVEREIGNTY THAT COURTS 
NOW REJECT. 
The birthplace of the plenary power doctrine, the Chinese Exclusion Case, relies on racist 
descriptions of Chinese immigrants that stoked xenophobia.  The Court stereotyped Chinese 
laborers as “industrious,” “frugal,” and “content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice 
for our laborers and artisans.”  130 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added).  These stereotypes informed 
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the xenophobia of the opinion, driven by fear of “strangers in the land, residing apart by 
themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country” – whose presence 
amounted to “an Oriental invasion.”  Id.; see also id. at 606 (“the government of the United 
States, through its legislative department,” could lawfully “consider[] the presence of foreigners 
of a different race…who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security” 
despite the absence of “actual hostilities”) (emphasis added). 
Justice Field’s acceptance of Congress’s conclusion that Chinese immigrants were 
incompatible with American society due to “differences of race” drove the outcome in plenary 
power doctrine cases, which are “inextricably linked” to the idea of the “‘Other’ in America 
today, whether by virtue of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or citizenship status.”  Natsu 
Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The Plenary Power 
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 Asian Am. L.J. 13, 13 (2003).   
Similar racist and xenophobic justifications pervade plenary power doctrine cases that 
relied on the Chinese Exclusion Case.  The “right of self-preservation” advanced as justification 
for the plenary power doctrine’s broad immunity in these exclusion cases was plainly ethnic and 
racial self-preservation, not the preservation of borders or national security. See, e.g., Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 608; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893) 
(discussing the requirement that Chinese resident aliens prove the fact of their U.S. residence “by 
at least one credible white witness” in order to remain in the country);  Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 664 & n.1 (1892) (exclusion of Japanese immigrant who was “likely to 
become a public charge”).2  These racial underpinnings have led courts to apply the plenary 
                                           
2 Later cases do not explicitly discuss or express support for race-based distinctions, but do so 
implicitly through their reliance on the reasoning of the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny.
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power doctrine, relying on an “aberrational form of the typical relationship between statutory 
interpretation and constitutional law” in the area of immigration law.  Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 549 (1990); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 Constitutional Commentary 9, 33 (1990) 
(Chinese exclusion laws “should serve as cautionary examples to those who would urge that the 
immigration power be left unconstrained by the Constitution in order to promote the 
maintenance of ‘communities of character.’”). 
The overt racism of these cases contributes to an additional flaw in the doctrine – its 
foundation in an outdated and race-based meaning of sovereignty.  The Chinese Exclusion Case 
states that “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners” is “an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States . . . delegated by the constitution.”3  130 U.S. at 609.  Since 
then, the concept of sovereignty has evolved to incorporate principles of fundamental human 
rights and anti-discrimination, shifting the system “from the protection of sovereigns to the 
protection of people.” See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866, 872 (1990).  This change is reflected in 
congressional action incorporating these principles in federal law. See, e.g., Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6501 et. seq. (1998) (adopting United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and authorizing issuance of related regulations, which 
                                                                                                                                        
See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); United States ex rel. 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). 
3  This same race-based concept of sovereignty is discussed at length in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, which explained that, historically, “negroes of African race” were not “constituent 
members of this sovereignty[.]”  60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856).  Therefore, they had “none of the 
rights and privileges” that the Constitution “provides for and secures to citizens of the United 
States” but only “such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant 
them.”  Id. at 404-05. 
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prevent the U.S. government from removing or extraditing aliens to countries where they may be 
subject to torture); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965), ratified by 140 Cong. Rec. S7634 (daily 
ed. June 24, 1994); see also Motomura at 566 (“By the 1950s, aliens’ rights decisions beyond the 
scope of immigration law already conflicted with assumptions implicit in the plenary power 
doctrine.”).  These changes also require reinterpretation, or modernization, of other norms to 
avoid “the absurdity of mechanically applying an old norm without reference to fundamental 
constitutive changes.”  Reisman at 873.   
Perhaps reflective of the shift away from race-based characterizations and the outdated 
meaning of sovereignty, modern courts have refused to abdicate their power to judicially review 
immigration matters.  Relying on early dissents in plenary power cases, numerous lower courts 
now apply contemporary constitutional principles in reviewing immigration actions by the 
political branches.  Indeed, after more than a century of erosion, the plenary power doctrine does 
not appear to retain the support of a majority of justices on the current Supreme Court.  See
Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (in visa denial case, plurality opinion did not rely on 
plenary power); see also Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!,
114 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 21 (2015) (noting that while the Court declined to repudiate 
the plenary power doctrine in Kerry v. Din, the split between the Justices suggests the doctrine is 
no longer as impactful as it once was).  As explained below, courts have not abdicated – and 
should not abdicate – their responsibility to uphold constitutional safeguards in the area of 
immigration. 
One of the earliest plenary power cases, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, generated three 
dissenting opinions, each of which highlighted a resident alien’s ties to the United States as a 
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basis to justify greater legal protection.  149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that 
there is any arbitrary and unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”).  Justice 
Field – who four years earlier announced the opinion of the court in the Chinese Exclusion Case
– dissented in Fong Yue Ting.  Even while praising the Chinese Exclusion Case, upon which the 
majority relied to reach its holding, Justice Field sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s 
application with regard to non-citizen residents:
As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all 
the guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they are subject to 
any different law, or are less protected in any particular, than other 
persons, is, in my judgment, to ignore the teachings of our history, 
the practice of our government, and the language of our 
constitution.
Id. at 754 (Fields, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained plenary power 
persisted.  Dissenting in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Justice Douglas drew on Justice Brewer’s 
dissent in Fong Yue Ting, arguing that the implied power of deportation should not be given 
priority over the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.  342 U.S. 580, 599-600 (1952) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas repeated Justice Brewer’s warning: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both 
indefinite and dangerous . . . The governments of other nations 
have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written 
constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent 
powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this 
constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a 
power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, as it 
seems to me, they gave to this government no general power to 
banish.
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).   
Along with Justices Black, Jackson, and Frankfurter, Justice Douglas supported 
limitations to the plenary power doctrine.  These Justices, dissenting in influential McCarthy-era 
plenary power cases, “expressed serious concern that aliens would be denied access to judicial 
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review in such harsh and unremitting terms.”  Motomura at 560; see also Mezei, 345 U.S. at 217 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“No society is free where government makes one person’s liberty depend 
upon the arbitrary will of another. Dictatorships have done this since time immemorial. They do 
now.”); id. at 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I conclude that detention of an alien would not be 
inconsistent with substantive due process, provided – and this is where my dissent begins – he is 
accorded procedural due process of law.”). 
Over time, the dissents in Mezei, Knauff, and Harisiades gained influence, leading to “an 
expansion in the number and range of claims that courts, including the Supreme Court, would 
hear in immigration cases.”  Motomura at 560.  Lower courts have declined to abdicate review 
entirely and instead have applied “the rational basis test to substantive due process and equal 
protection challenges [arising from deportation]; . . . the traditional Mathews v. Eldridge factors 
to procedural due process challenges; and . . . First Amendment standards to [immigration] 
restrictions [arising out of] political speech and association.”  Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More 
Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 925, 
934–35 (1995); see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (holding that despite the 
broad power of the political branches over immigration, INS regulations must meet the rational 
basis test by “rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose”); Raya-Ledesma v. 
I.N.S., 55 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding application of residency requirement for 
discretionary relief from deportation had a rational basis and therefore did not violate legal 
permanent resident’s right to equal protection); Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 478-79 
(W.D. La. 1993) (engaging in substantive due process analysis as to whether detention imposed 
was “merely incidental to another legitimate governmental purpose”); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 
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F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1987) (“We hold that even excludable aliens are entitled to the 
protection of the due process clause while they are physically in the United States. . . .”). 
Thus, as these cases have implicitly recognized, courts are not required to defer 
completely to the exercise of executive or legislative power over immigration matters.   
II. REVIEWING THE EXECUTIVE ORDER WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE 
PROPER EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER, BUT WILL PROTECT 
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS. 
Amici recognize that there are limits to judicial review and judicial overreach could 
interfere with sensitive political matters and foreign relations.  Those concerns, however, should 
not preclude judicial review of the Executive Order, particularly when the Supreme Court has 
cautioned against classifications based on national origin. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (classifications based on national origin are “so seldom 
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such 
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy”). 
Neither the Plaintiffs nor Amici suggest that the judiciary can or should review every 
decision of the political branches.  Review is necessary here because the Executive Order applies 
such a broad brush – suspending visas, prohibiting entry, and foreclosing any adjudications for 
all aliens of certain nationalities.  Despite its purported aim of protecting national security by 
excluding possible terrorists, the Executive Order prohibits the entry of every person from the 
seven countries, ranging from infants seeking lifesaving medical attention to refugees fleeing 
civil war to wheelchair-bound senior citizens.4
                                           
4  In a different context, the Supreme Court has cautioned that overly broad state action 
toward a specified group may be indicative of discriminatory intent.  In Romer v. Evans, the 
Court stated: “‘[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration 
to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’”  517 U.S. 620, 633 
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That the political branches might use national security as a smokescreen to discriminate 
against disfavored populations is not an unfounded concern.  The Korematsu Center owes its 
existence to just such an incident: the shameful, World War II-era forced relocation and 
incarceration of more than 100,000 men, women and children of Japanese descent, purportedly 
for national security reasons, challenged in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
More than a half-century after that decision, the Solicitor General confessed error, 
acknowledging that the federal government knew at the time of the mass incarcerations that only 
“a small percentage of Japanese Americans posed a potential security threat, and that the most 
dangerous were already known or in custody.”  Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor 
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Interment Cases, Dep’t of Justice: Justice 
Blogs (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-
mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases; see also Neal K. Katyal, The Solicitor 
General and Confession of Error, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3027 (2013).  The federal government’s 
revelation occurred decades after a district court reversed Mr. Korematsu’s conviction and found 
“substantial support in the record that the government deliberately omitted relevant information 
and provided misleading information in papers before the court.” Korematsu v. United States,
584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  The district court added that the Supreme Court’s 
decision “stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national 
security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and 
accountability.” Id. Instead, courts “must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all 
citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.”  Id.
                                                                                                                                        
(1996) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).  If the 
breadth of such a law is “so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it,” it leads inexorably to 
the conclusion that the law was motivated by prejudice and bias, not a legitimate state interest.  
Id. at 632. 
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Engaging in judicial review, when circumstances suggest that executive or legislative 
action arises from such fears and prejudices, provides that protection while simultaneously 
extending judicial scrutiny to only a limited category of actions by the political branches.  The 
use of such a standard for deciding when review is warranted would, in fact, have had no effect 
on most of the Supreme Court plenary power doctrine cases decided since World War II.  For 
instance, Knauff and Mezei challenged exclusion decisions made on an individual basis.  In each 
case, individuals were denied entry following determination that their admission was contrary to 
the public interest. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544-47; Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209-15.  Although the 
Supreme Court invoked the plenary power doctrine in each case, and Mezei expressly relied on 
the Chinese Exclusion Case, neither decision provides any support for the argument that 
wholesale exclusions by race or nationality remain immune from review.  The same is true of 
other Supreme Court decisions on which the United States has relied to support its plenary power 
argument.  See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (appeal of deportation 
order based on finding that individual had committed serious, non-political crime); Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (appeal from exclusion order by permanent resident alien barred 
from returning to the United States); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89 (appeals from three separate 
deportation orders based on aliens’ past membership in the Communist Party); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (denial of individual visa). 
Thus, when a court engages in judicial review of policies directed at entire groups under 
circumstances suggestive of discriminatory intent, the court does not overstep its authority, but 
acts consistent with core constitutional principles. 
III. HISTORY REPUDIATES DECISIONS THAT ABDICATE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST ENTIRE RACES 
OR NATIONALITIES.  
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Perhaps it is not surprising that less than a decade after deciding the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, the Supreme Court upheld racial segregation under the doctrine of “separate but equal” in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy was, of course, overturned on Equal Protection 
grounds in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and, like other cases 
that establish broad authority to discriminate against entire races or nationalities, are now 
considered the nadir of American jurisprudence.  One reason, perhaps, that the Asian exclusion 
cases were not overturned by courts, unlike Plessy, is that the Asian exclusion and naturalization 
cases were abrogated by legislation. See Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101-1537 et seq. (eliminating the racial bar to naturalization); Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101, 1151-1157, 1181–1182, 1201-1202, 1204, 1227, 1253–1255, 1259, 1322, 1351) 
(abolishing discriminatory national origin quotas from the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 
68-139, 43 Stat. 153, which pegged the desired racial demographics of this country based on 
1890 Census). 
Plessy and Korematsu are both considered cases that “embod[y] a set of propositions that 
all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.”  Jamal Greene, The Anticanon,
125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380 (2011); see also Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 303, 304 (1998) (“Commentators have called Plessy ‘ridiculous and shameful,’ ‘racist and 
repressive,’ and a ‘catastrophe.’”). 
 In much the same way the government urges here, those decisions gave broad deference 
to the political branches of government to take action against disfavored minorities.  History, 
however, has rejected judicial sanction of those actions.  Not only do modern courts dismiss 
those cases as wrongly decided, they condemn those courts for allowing racist views to go 
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unchecked by the judiciary. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the use of strict scrutiny in Korematsu to “yield[] a 
pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial classification . . .  A Korematsu-type classification . . . 
will never again survive scrutiny: Such a classification, history and precedent instruct, properly 
ranks as prohibited.”); Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432, 441 (2002) (“Half a century of 
equal protection jurisprudence has confirmed the error of [Korematsu’s] wartime judicial 
abdication.”); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We 
Need A New Legal Regime After September 11?: The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1257, 1259 (2004) (complete “judicial acquiescence or abdication” of performing checks 
on presidential power “has a name.  That name is Korematsu”); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond
Suspect Classifications, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 739, 748-51 (2014) (deferential standard of review 
applied in Plessy was “incapable of identifying and addressing contemporary prejudices”).
History will look similarly at this case and this Court if it allows the Executive Order to 
evade review.  Permitting the Executive Order to stand under the plenary power doctrine—a 
doctrine rooted in racism and xenophobia—will be seen for what it is:  the judiciary’s abdication 
of its duty to stand as a bulwark against those who would undermine the nation’s core 
constitutional principles. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the 
illegality of the Executive Order.
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ORGANIZATIONS, AND NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(A)(1)(c), undersigned counsel for Amici 
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The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is a research 
and advocacy organization based at Seattle University, a non-profit educational institution under 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.  The Korematsu Center does not have any 
parent corporation or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held corporation 
which owns 10 percent or more of its stock. 
Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the South Asian Bar Association of North 
America and are not-for-profit organizations with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.   
The National Native American Bar Association has an affiliate 501(c)(3) not-for-profit 
charitable arm, the National Native American Bar Association Foundation, but has no other 
parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.   
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 
 
TAREQ AQEL MOHAMMED AZIZ, et al., 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v.        Case No. 17-cv-116-LMB-TCB 
         
DONALD TRUMP, President of the     
United States, et al.,  
 
Respondents. 
 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF 
AMICUS CURIAE THE FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY, 
CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, AND NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF 
COLOR, IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS 
 
Having considered the Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners filed by the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Civil Rights 
Organizations, and National Bar Associations of Color, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion 
is GRANTED.  The Clerk is directed to accept the proposed brief for filing.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
DATED: __________, 2017   ___________________________ 
The Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema 
United States District Court Judge 
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